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REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: 
METHOD FOR A NEW APPROACH 
FERNANDO L. CANALE 
Andrews University 
My first article' explored the ground on which a new 
approach to the doctrine of revelation and inspiration could be 
eventually developed. In this second article I consider the method 
by which a new approach to revelation-inspiration as theological 
problem may be developed. 
The thesis of this article is that the method to be followed in 
clarifying the epistemological2 origin of Scripture is the 
methodology utilized by systematic theology. However, this 
methodology must be adjusted to the historical nature of the 
ground uncovered in the first article. 
1 .  Beyond Biblical Scholarship 
A consistent commitment to the sda Scriphcra principle3 led us, 
in the first article, to uncover a ground Christian theology has 
forgotten and neglected, namely, the historical conception of both 
God and human nature. On the basis of such a ground not only the 
'Fernando L. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New 
Approach," AUSS 31 (1993): 91-104. 
ZEpistemology is the area of philosophical study that deals with the 
understanding and interpretation of human knowledge and its scientific enterprise. 
Thus, "epistemological origin of biblical writings" makes direct reference to the 
cognitive nature of the origin of biblical writings, to the exclusion of other historical 
considerations. 
3Wolfhart Pannenberg considers that the attempt to develop Christian theology 
on the basis of sda Scriptura was an "illusion" ('The Crisis of the Scripture-Principle 
in Protestant Theology," Dialogue 2 [1963]: 308). He explains that "the development 
of historical research led to the dissolution of the Scripture-principle, at least as 
seventeenth century orthodoxy held it" (ibid., 310). Pannenberg may be right as long 
as he is describing an accomplished historical fact. Yet, from a theological view 
point there is no reason why biblical scholarship should uncritically accept a method 
that looks for realities and meaning "behind" the text (ibid., 311,313). 
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doctrine of revelation, but also the whole range of Christian 
teachings, should be examined anew. The exploration of such a 
possibility, however, requires the possession not only of untrodden 
ground, but also of an appropriate and working methodology that 
would lend itself to the processing of pertinent data in search of 
ever-growing knowledge about the subject matter under scrutiny, 
namely, the origin of Scripture. 
The question before us is, then: How should Christian 
theology proceed to define a theological position about the origin 
of Scripture which is able to integrate all the pertinent data 
provided by Scripture itself? I am aware that such a question may 
seem superfluous to Christians who adhere to the soh Scriptura 
principle. For them the mere asking of such a question may suggest 
a suspicious lack of confidence in the Bible as ground and norm of 
all doctrine and practice, or even a lack of genuine conversion. 
Christians who uphold what they call a "high view" of Scriptures 
seem to have no doubt about the methodology to be followed: a 
technical interpretation of the origin of Scripture can only be 
obtained by going to the Bible itself. In other words, exegesis and 
biblical theology should deal with the issue of revelation and 
inspiration on the sure foundation of biblical revelation. 
The obvious limitation of the exegetical-biblical methodology 
in relation to the exploration of the doctrine of revelation and 
inspiration is that the Bible does not provide a technical explana- 
tion of its epistemological origin. Scripture merely states that it was 
produced by God without specifically addressing the issue of the 
process through which it came into being? Even though biblical 
teachings about Scripture clearly state its divine origin, no theory 
about revelation and inspiration is found in either Old or New 
Testament. Consequently, the exegetical-biblical approach that 
conservative Protestant theology usually follows in developing its 
doctrines may not suffice for rendering a satisfactory interpretation 
'Benjamin 8. Warfield's attempt at deriving the theory of verbal plenary 
inspiration from the biblical doctrine of Scripture has been criticized, according to 
Peter M. van Bemmelen, because it "is an unwarranted deduction negated by testing 
that dochine by the biblical phenomena" (Issues in Biblical Inspiration: Sunday and 
Warfield Brrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 19881,308). Van Bemmelen 
concludes that this aiticism "does not necessarily mean that the doctrine of 
inerrancy is unbiblical, but it certainly does raise the question whether a Biblical 
doctrine of inspiration in regard to its mode, extent, and especially in regards to its 
effects can be derived by means of a purely inductive method" (ibid.). 
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of revelation-in~piration.~ Persistence in addressing the issues 
involved in the doctrine of revelation and inspiration only from a 
biblical-exegetical perspective will confirm its essential limitation. 
It is likewise possible to affirm that since the biblical doctrine 
of Scripture does not include a theoretical clarification of its epis- 
temological origin, the discipline of biblical scholarship and its 
proper methodology seem to be of little help when the interpreta- 
tion of the doctrine of revelation and inspiration is attempted 
exclusively from a biblical perspective? One must move, then, 
beyond the exegetical-biblical methodology, as currently defined by 
scholarship, into a biblical redefinition of the systematic approach? 
2. Beyond Apologetics 
When the rnindset of the Enlightenment and its critical 
approach to history became influential within liberal Christian 
circles, the supernatural role of God became almost obliterated 
from the epistemological explanation of the origin of Scripture. The 
conservative wing of evangelical theology, however, did not 
welcome the new conception of Scripture, because it was con- 
sidered to be a serious programmatic departure from orthodox 
Christian teachings? In order to defend their traditional theological 
?'he epistemological origin of Scriptures is not the only issue that cannot be 
satisfactorily addressed by means of an exegetical-biblical approach. The full range 
of doctrines also appears as theological s u b j j  matter which, clearly beyond the 
natural range of exegesis and biblical theology, properly belongs to the field of 
systematic theology. 
6For instance, within the Adventist tradition recent discussion on revelation- 
inspiration has moved mainly within the limits of biblical scholarship, historical 
research, and apologetics. Alden Thompson's proposal seems to stem from the 
limitations required by biblical scholarship (see his Inspiration: Hard Questions, Honest 
Answers Magerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 19911). The theological discussion 
that Thompson's proposal generated seems to work within the same general 
parameters (see Frank Holbrook and Leo Van Dolson, ed., Issues in Repelation und 
Inspiration [Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist Theological Soaety, 19921). An exception 
to this general trend appears in Raoul Dederen, 'The Revelation-Inspiration 
Phenomenon According to the Bible Writers" (ibid., 9-29), where the systematic 
approach is also present. 
'By going beyond biblical scholarship into systematics, I am referring to the 
methodology that is required for appropriately dealing with theological issues and 
not to the replacement or complementation of Scriptures by other sources of 
theological data. 
%ee Norman L. Gisler, "Philosophical Presuppositions of Biblical Errancy," in 
Inerruncy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1979), 307-334. 
1 74 FERNANDO L. CANALE 
conceptions, evangelicals reaffirmed the classical understanding of 
the origin of Scripture, turning it into an apologetical approach. 
The traditional doctrine of the supernatural origin of Scripture was 
reaffirmed as an apologetical tool against modern and postmodern 
interpretations of Scripture? According to conservative evangelical- 
ism, God is the author of Scripture, and consequently no error is 
to be found in it. Scripture is infallible and hue because of its 
supernatural, divine origin. Not only is the Bible without error, but 
its truth is grounded a priori by reason of its origin. It logically 
follows that no a posteriori verification of its contents is necessary. 
Just as modern philosophy developed out of the epistemo- 
logical problem of the origin of knowledge, modern theology 
appears to have begun in a similar way, by questioning the 
supernatural origin of Scripture. The apologetical context, within 
which conservative evangelical reflection on the epistemological 
origin of Scripture has been pursued, has brought a veritable 
stagnation in the search for a theory about revelation-inspiration 
which may account for both the phenomena of Scripture and the 
biblical doctrine of Scripture. 
In this respect James Barn may be right when he considers the 
theological creativity of conservative evangelical theology as 
"stodgy, apologetic, uncreative," and monumentally dull.'' Yet, in 
relation to the specific interpretation of the epistemological origin 
of Scripture, he himself seems to fall into the same theological 
stagnation. Modern and postmodern schools of Christian theology 
seem not to have advanced much beyond Schleiermacher's 
interpretation." In regard to the origin of Scripture, contemporary 
theology seems to be caught between two alternatives: the classical 
interpretation that overemphasizes the role of the divine agency 
and the modern-postmodern trend, which since Schleiermacher has 
9See Ren6 Pache, The Inspiration and Authority of Scripture, trans. Helen I. 
Needham [Chicago: Moody, 19691,304-305). 
"James Barr, The Scope and Authority of the Bible (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1980), 72, 73. 
"The Christian Faith, English translation from the 2d German ed., ed. by H. R. 
Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1948), § 3 , s  4,s 5 and the 
postscript to 10. James Barr, who properly criticizes fundamentalism for its lack 
of creativity, exhibits the same deficiency as he deals with the authority and function 
of the Bible in Christian theology. Barr only defends the Schleiermacherian 
conception of the origin of Suiphue, and particularly the historical-critical 
methodology that corresponds to it (Scope and Authority of the Bible, 30-58). 
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almost obliterated the divine agency from the constitution of 
biblical writings. Neither of the two, however, is able to satis- 
factorily integrate all the pertinent data. These positions and their 
limitations will be discussed later. 
The bracketing out of the apologetical approach from the area 
in which the doctrine of revelation and inspiration is to be 
discussed becomes, therefore, a necessary methodological step to 
uncover the subject matter to be interpreted, namely, the episte- 
mological origin of the Bible. It follows that an investigation into 
the way in which the Bible was originated should be carried on 
within the epistemological realm of investigation rather than within 
the realm of apologetics, as traditionally done." Moreover, as the 
issue of revelation and inspiration is explored, apologetical 
concerns should not be entertained. Finally, the doctrine of 
revelation and inspiration should not be utilized as the a priori 
verification of the content of Christian re~elation,'~ but rather as the 
explanation of the way Sacred Scripture came into existence. 
3. Systematic Theology and Philosophy 
Beyond the exegetical-biblical and apologetical methodologies 
there is another way, that of systematic theology. The systematic 
way, however, presents challenges and difficulties of its own, 
which, unless recognized and adequately solved, lead to theories 
about revelation and inspiration at odds with both the biblical 
doctrine of Scripture and Scripture itself." These difficulties derive 
12 Carl Henry's massive enterprise, God, Reaelatbn, and Authority (6 vols. [Waco, 
TX: Word Books, 197619831), is a clear example of a reflection on revelation and 
inspiration undertaken within the area of apologetics. 
13For most Protestants and evangelicals the authority and truthfulness of 
Scriptures is decided a priori in the affirmation of its divine inspiration (see 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Thmlogy, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 19911, 1: 2635, 48). Pannenberg suggests that the truth of 
dogmatics is a question that cannot be decided in advance of systematic reflection, 
but as a result of it (1:s). Without denying the connection between divine origin 
and authority, we should not, for that reason, eliminate the need for a posteriori 
theological verification of biblical teachings as a whole as the proper task of 
apologetics. Prior to that, however, the tasks of epistemological foundation, 
exegetical-biblical research, and systematic reflection should be performed; otherwise 
there would be nothing to verify or defend. 
"For instance, Klaas Runia has pointed out that Karl Barth, recognizing the 
essential limitation of the biblical-exegetical method, went on to impose a dogmatic 
criterion upon the biblical texts, so "that the texts themselves are not allowed to 
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from the way in which the relation between theology and 
philosophy is concei~ed.'~ Because systematic theology as a 
scholarly discipline of Christian theology has been openly 
dependent on philosophical methods, contents, and traditi~ns,'~ it 
is necessary to deal, albeit briefly, with the way systematic 
theology and philosophy relate to each other. At least since the 
time of Justin's ~plogfes,' philosophical concepts have been called 
to assist the constitution of Christian theology, particularly within 
speak first" (Karl Barth's Doctrine of Holy Scripture [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1%2], 137). In other words, Runia is convinced that "the concept of inspiration is 
not derived [by Barlh] from Saipture itself, but Scripture is read in the light of a 
preconceived criterion" (ibid.). 
''In his "The Idea of Systematic Theology," B. B. Warfield does not address this 
foundational issue (The Necessity of Sysfematic Theology, ed. John Jefferson Davis 
[Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 19781, 131-165). Perhaps this is the kind of approach 
Winfried Corduan had in mind when he pointed out that evangelical theologians 
too frequently carry out the theological task "without taking the proper 
philosophical roots into account" (Handmaid to Theology: An Essay in Philosophical 
Prolegomena [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 19811,ll). 
''See, for instance, Gerhard Ebeling, The Study of Theology, trans. Duane A. 
Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 53-58; John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian 
Theology, 2d ed. (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), 21-25; and Bernard 
Lonergan, Method in Thwlogy (New York: Seabury, 1972), 335-340. 
"While Justin did not "mean to bring Christians and philosophers more closely 
together" (Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, [New York Dover, 19611, 2: 188), his 
conception of an essential continuity between Plato's ideas and those of the Old 
Testament VIortatoty Address to the Greeks 29) and his idea that Christ was the 
fullness of the same reason used by Socrates (Apdogy 2-10) seem to represent a clear 
movement away from Paul's warning against "deptive philosophy" (Col 2:B). 
Sharing the same apologetical role, Aristides did not hesitate to present himself as 
a philosopher to the Athenians (Harnack, 2: 177). The apologists of the second 
century A.D., however, represent only the initial stage (see Justo L. Gonzalez, A 
History of Christian Thought, [Nashville: Abingdon, 1970],1: 109-110) of what would 
become a substantial and systematic role in the School of Alexandria, notably in the 
writings of Clement (Stromata, 6.5; see also Gonzalez, 1: 197) and Origen (see G. W. 
Butterworth, 'Introduction" to Origen's On First Principles [Gloucester: Peter Smith, 
19731, lvii). The role of philosophy as constitutive of the theological task has also its 
antecedent in the Judaism of Alexandria, in which Philo became the most notable 
exponent of a thoroughgoing attempt "to interpret Jewish theology in terms of 
Hellenistic philosophy" 0. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 4th ed. [London: 
Adam & Charles Black, 1968],1819). Richard Kroner expresses the rather debatable 
idea that specific contents of Greek philosophical speculation are already present in 
the Gospel of John (Speculation and Reoelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy 
[Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959],23-24; cf. Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of fohn: A 
Commentary, trans. G. R. Beasley-Murray (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19711, 19-36). 
REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: A NEW APPROACH 177 
its systematic field." In the writing of influential theologians, such 
as Origen of Alexandria or Augustine of Hippo, philosophy was 
already playing an important role in the shaping of Christian 
theologyI9. Philosophy has been called to provide the intellectual 
framework or system required for the task of doing theology, 
particularly systematic theology.20 Even today most of Christian 
theology is built on this unchallenged working assumption. The 
specific school of philosophy that theology may choose to employ 
may change, yet the general consensus among theologians seems 
to indicate that philosophy is still considered to be the provider of 
the "system" of systematic theology. The Roman Catholic tradition 
has always recognized openly the need to use human philosophical 
concepts in the task of doing theology and determining the dogmas 
of the churchn 
From the times of Luther, Protestantism has been known for 
its rather explicit denunciation of philosophy as a contributor to the 
task of theology? which must be grounded solely on Scripture? 
'&For a brief synthesis of the progressive way in which philosophy was utilized 
by Christian theology, see Johannes Hirschberger, The Histmy of Philosophy, trans. 
from German by Anthony N. Fuerst (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce, 1958), 1: 290-292). 
' m e  history of the way philosophy has been permanently related to the 
development of Christian theology has been analyzed and evaluated by Kroner, 
among others. 
'"Avery Dulles explains that "it is impossible to carry through the project of 
systematic theology without explicit commitment to particular philosophical options" 
(The Craft of Thedosy: From Symbol to System New York: Crossroad, 19921, 119). 
21Conservative Roman Catholicism has developed on the basis of Aristotle's 
philosophy as interpreted by Thomas Aquinas and scholasticism (Dulls, 119-133; 
Hans Kiing, Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View, trans. Peter 
Heinegg [New York: Doubleday, 19881, 104-106, 182-186). Contemporary Roman 
Catholicism is challenging the traditional incorporation of the Aristotelic-Thomistic 
philosophy by exploring other philosophical schools, for instance, process 
philosophy (see David Tracy, Bkssed Rage for Order: The New Plurdism in Theology 
[New York: Harper & Row, 19881,172-203). 
s l y  in his career Martin Luther strongly denounced philosophy, especially 
that of Aristotle as interpreted by Thomas Aquinas (Sigbert W. Becker, The 
Fuolishness of God: The Place 4 Reason in the Theology of Martin Luther [Milwaukee: 
Northwestern, 1982],4-7). However, Becker points out that Luther did not dismiss 
the function of human philosophy per se within the realms of theology but rather 
its Aristotelic-Thomistic interpretation as adopted by scholasticism (ibid., 7-81. For 
a contemporary example of rejecting philosophy as source of theology, see Pache, 
19-20. In his well-balanced evaluation of Calvin's relation to philosophy, Charles B. 
Partee reports that "Calvin accepts some of their [classical philosophers1 views and 
178 FERNANDO L CANALE 
However, a certain sector of Protestantism has understood that 
Scriptures are not to be conceived as "the only guide," but rather 
the "ultimate guide" for the church? As a cursory look at 
Protestant orthodoxy at its best reveals, the denunciation of 
philosophy did not imply, even for this sector, an absolute rejection 
of its traditional role." On the contrary, philosophy still appears as 
the main provider of "system" or intellectual framework for the 
development of Protestant theology? On the other hand, some 
rejects others" (Calvin and Classical Philosophy [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 19771, 15). Calvin's 
use of philosophy as an aid to the theological exposition of Scriptures (ibid., 21), 
then, appears selective rather than comprehensive (ibid., 18). Calvin, concludes 
Partee, selects philosophical ideas for theological purposes "when he feels they serve 
the truth of ScriptureW'(ibid., 22). 
1576 the Formula of Concord stated that "we believe, teach, and confess 
that the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testaments are the 
only rule and norm according to which al l  doctrines and teachers alike must be 
appraised and judged" (The Bmk of Concold: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert [Philadelphia: Fortress, 19591,464). Even 
though the Formula of Concord uplifts the theological role of Scripture as the source 
of theology, it seems to lean more towards a prima Scriphrra rather than sola Scriphrra 
qualification of its theological role since it clearly remarks that "other writings of 
ancient and modem teachers, whatever their names, should not be put on a par with 
Holy Scripture. Every single one of them should be subordinated to the Scriptures 
and should be received in no other way and no further than as witness to the 
fashion in which the doctrine of the prophets and apostles was reserved in post- 
apostolic times" (ibid, 464-465); see also Clark H. Pinnock, Biblical Reuelation: The 
Foundation of Christian Theology [Chicago: Moody, 19711,156. 
24Kem Robert Trembath, Evangelical Theories of Biblical Inspiration: A Review and 
Proposal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 4. 
25As tradition, in which philosophical concepts played a constitutive role, was 
not rejected but rather accepted by Christian theology (e.g., Formula of Concord, 
[ibid., 465, 503-5M]), the actual possibility of a theological usage of human 
philosophical concepts is neither condemned nor eliminated. Bruce Vawter is of the 
opinion that "most of the early Protestant theologians had been trained as a matter 
of course in the scholastic system and accepted its dialectical principles virtually 
without question. However much, and however often with great justice, Martin 
Luther ridiculed the language and conclusions of scholasticism, there was always 
far more that connected him with its method and presuppositions than separated 
him from them" (Biblical Inspiration [Philadelphia: Westminster, 197'21, 76). Vawter 
further explains that the Reformers "did not substitute another system of thought 
for the scholastic. That they did not is amply demonstrated by the quite rapid 
transition of the Reformation into a Protestant orthodoxy of rigid scholasticism" 
(ibid.). 
%is is not the place for a detailed comparison of the ways in which the 
system is provided in classical and Protestant theologies. Suffice it to say that a 
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sectors within the broad spectrum of Protestant theology, inspired 
by the sola Scriphrra principle, try to minimize the influence of 
human philosophy on theology by reducing the latter to the 
disciplines of biblical exegesis and biblical theology, to the almost 
total neglect of systematic theology as an independent discipline 
within Christian theology? Even this more biblically oriented 
sector, however, sooner or later employs nonbiblical philosophical 
concepts as it ventures into the scholarly world of theological 
reflection.= 
foundational component of the Protestant theological system is drawn not from 
philosophy but from divine revelation. Justification by faith, the dochine on which 
the Church stands or falls, is called to play a central systematic role together with 
other components that the classical system of theology derived from philosophy. 
Thus, Arminius is able to develop an intellectualistic version of Protestantism very 
close to Thomism, and Norman Geisler is able to call Aquinas "a mature evangelical" 
(Thomas Aquinas: An Emngelical Appraisal [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 19911, 21-23). 
"Evangelical theologian Millard J. Erickson represents this sector. He considers 
the goal of systematics as "pure biblical theology contemporized" (Christian Theology 
[Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990],25), whereby "unchanging biblical teachings which 
are valid for all times" (ibid., 24) are put into an analogical "model that makes the 
doctrine intelligible in a contemporary context" (ibid., 74-75). Erickson also says that 
contemporizing is a "major part of the work of systematic theologyn (ibid., 75). 
Another role assigned to systematic theology is to "formulate a central motif' (ibid., 
77) to unify each theologian's system. According to Erickson, the central motif, 
however, only "enables us to perceive a landscape more accurately" and "must never 
determine our interpretations of passages where it is not relevant" (ibid.). Moreover, 
the task of systematics also includes the arrangement of theological "topics on the 
basis of their relative importance" (ibid., 78). Systematic theology, thus, is conceived 
as not being essentially involved in the discovery of truth but rather in the process 
of its communication. According to Erickson's view, Christian theology should not 
engage in constructive intellectual activities, but rather should concentrate on the 
mimesis (exegetical and biblical theologies) and translation (systematics) of biblical 
texts. The rules for the discovery of truth are, consequently, the rules of exegesis and 
biblical theology which render a descriptive summary of the theological ideas and 
positions presented by exegetical theology. This view does not allow systematics to 
develop ideas other than those produced by exegetical and biblical theologies. 
s i c k s o n  clearly states that "in making the Bible our primary or supreme 
source of understanding we are not completely excluding aU other sources" (ibid., 
37). He goes on to clarify that such additional sources "will be secondary to the 
Bible" (ibid.). The weakness of Erickson's position is to be found only when it is 
implemented. In other words, Erickson sets biblical primacy together with the input 
from other sciences. How we are supposed to work out the primacy of the Bible in 
the practice of doing theology is not sufficiently explained. It is likely that, sooner 
or later, the avowed primacy of biblical data will be surrendered to ideas coming 
from other sources. Erickson clarifies that philosophy may be used but no single 
system is to be followed (ibid., !3). Philosophy's role in theology is conceived as 
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It would appear that, by and large, the Protestant tradition of 
Christian theology has denounced human philosophical ideas 
selectively and used them pragmatically. Thus, philosophy is not 
used when it contradicts the basic doctrine of justification by faith, 
but it is accepted as long as it supporn it. Protestant denunciation 
of philosophy, then, has not involved a total rejection of humanly 
originated philosophy. On the contrary, Protestant the0108 
stands on the basis of principles derived from classical philosophy. 
Generally speaking, it seems that mainstream Protestant theol- 
ogy has rejected philosophy as a source while at the same time 
accepting it as a tool for theology." Within this sector of Protes- 
tantism, systematic theology is considered possible and works, as 
did classical theology, on a system provided by humanly originated 
philosophy. Precisely in this way philosophy becomes a "tool." 
In the more biblically oriented sector of Protestantism, 
however, emphasis on the sda Scriptura principle, according to 
which theology, mission, and life are grounded in the Bible:' 
sharpening our understanding of concepts, finding and evaluating presuppositions, 
tracing implications of ideas, and as a tool in apologetics (ibid., 56-57). What 
Erickson seems to forget is that there is no "neutral" philosophy. Each philosophy 
and its methodology involve interpretations of foundational principles. Additionally, 
Erickson still understands presuppositions as if they related only to communication 
of truth rather than to content. This situation opens a vacuum that sooner or later 
is filled by a humanly originated philosophical content. For instance, Greek 
philosophical ideas seem to be ultimately behind Erickson's understanding of the 
immortality of the soul (ibid., 1183-1184), God's eternity (ibid., 274-275), 
predestination (ibid., 35&620), and providence (ibid., 394-401). 
w e  are referring here to the technical level of theological reflection and not 
to the way in which the believer experiences theological teachings. At the level of 
the local church the influence of human philosophy on doctrinal content often seems 
to be nonexistent or even totally absent. To ascertain the degree in which humanly 
originated philosophy conditions the constitution of doctrines at the level of 
individual local churches would require a major statistical study. 
30According to Robert Preus, Lutheran dogmaticians of the 17th century 
considered Scripture to be the only source of Christian theology (The Inspiration of 
Scripture: A Study of the Theology of the Seven teenth-Century Lutheran Dogmaticians 
[Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957],1-4). However, they found no overlap between 
the realm of theology (supernatural) and the realm of philosophy (natural) (ibid., 10- 
11). Thus "reason used passively is necessary for gaining and understanding 
information. In this sense it is a mean (principium quo), for only through his reason, 
or intellect, does man understand (ibid., 9). 
3'Clark H. Pinnock, "How I Use the Bible in Doing Theology," in The Use 4 the 
Bible in Theology: Etmngelical Options, ed. by Robert K. Johnston (Atlanta: John Knox, 
1985), 1819. 
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seems to militate against the very existence of systematic theology 
as a necessary theological discipline? Two basic reasons seem to 
recommend the dismissal of systematic theology as an independent 
theological discipline. First, it seems obvious to this sector of 
Protestantism that if the Bible is the source of theology, exegesis 
and biblical theology constitute the only required methodology to 
reach Christian truth. Moreover, since systematic theology has 
always derived its "system from some form of human philosophy, 
the strong suspicion that systematic theology of necessity violates 
the sda Scriphrra principle cannot be avoided. 
4. Toward a Biblical Philosophy 
The working and unexpressed presupposition behind the view 
that sees an unavoidable contradiction between the mla Scriphrra 
principle and the existence of a systematic approach to theology is 
the axiom that systematic theology cannot be produced without the 
essential contribution of some form of humanly originated 
phil~sophy?~ If such an assumption were true, I agree, no 
 rant R. Osborne may be taken as example of such a trend when he assigns 
to systematic theology only the task of contextualizing and organizing biblical 
theology in current thought patterns for the contemporary situation (The 
Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensizw Introduction to Biblical Interpretation [Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 19911, 267, 309). The proper task of theology is thereby 
reduced to communicating biblical truth to the contemporary mind. Osborne allows 
systematics to have a say in what the Bible means in the contemporary setting (ibid., 
26&269), but systematics has no role in the constitution of truth. Truth is simply and 
directly found in the Bible and retrieved by exegetical and biblical theologies. In 
Osborne's understanding "dogmatic theology collects the material generated by 
biblical theology and restates or reshapes it into a modem logical pattern, 
integrating these aspects into a confessional statement for the church today" (ibid., 
268). Osborne seems to believe that the retrieval of biblical truth does not require 
the adoption of a system and, therefore, does not need the role of systematics as 
theological discipline. To Osborne's credit I must say that he is aware of the 
problem. The theological tradition from which he derives his preunderstanding, 
however, does not allow him to go further into a better or more complete 
conception of the tasks involved in doing theology (ibid., 269). 
%is "unthought" presupposition is explicitly reflected upon and expressed by 
Winfried Corduan, who introduces his rehabilitation of philosophy as handmaid to 
theology by remarking that "philosophy permeates systematic theology. The 
theologian cannot ever get away from the fact that philosophical thinking is an 
integrd part of the way that we understand and disseminate revealed truth. Certain 
philosophical points need to be made prior to beginning actual theology. But that 
does not mean that once they are made we are done with philosophy. On the 
contrary, wherever we turn in theology, we are confronted with the need for clear 
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systematic theology or systematic approach to Christian theology 
would be possible while holding, at the same time, the soh 
Scriptura principle.u In this context my proposal for a systematic 
approach to the study of revelation and inspiration could be 
understood as a subreptitious attempt to utilize humanly originated 
philosophy at the detriment or plain rejection of the sola Scriptura 
principle following the classical, modern, and postmodem trends 
in Christian theology. My proposal, however, does not attempt 
such a thing. 
Evangelical theologian Donald Bloesch has correctly identified 
the relation between theology and philosophy as "probably the 
single most important issue in a theological prolegomenon.'" 
However, it is far from accurate to say that only human philosophy 
can provide a system for systematic theology,16 that human 
philosophical categories. Thus even when we enter the arena of soteriology we have 
not outgrown the need for philosophy" (10). I agree with Corduan's description of 
the systematic function of philosophical presuppositions. I disagree with the 
seemingly universally accepted idea that the philosophy to be used in Christian 
theology cannot be grounded in and derived from biblical thought. Corduan follows 
the generally accepted procedure of selecting the human philosophy that theology 
will adopt from the starting point of biblical pointers (see, e.g., ibid., 41-59). Thus, 
the creative philosophical reflection that the discovery of a biblical philosophy 
requires is methodologically avoided. 
%For instance, authors who allow human philosophy to play a "minimalw yet 
important role in the task of doing theology are forced to reinterpret the sola 
Scriptura principle as involving only the idea of a "superiority of the Bible to other 
authorities, including ecclesiastical officers, church councils and previous doctrinal 
formulas" (Richard Rice, Reason and the Contours of Faith [Riverside, CA: La Sierra 
University Press], 93). Thus the sola Sniptwra principle is abandoned (ibid.). In 
practice, tradition and the experience of the church are added to the Bible as sources 
of theology. Rice concludes that "the essential task of Christian theology is that of 
biblical interpretation, in view of the authoritative status of the Bible in the church. 
But it also involves careful attention to interpretations that have developed in the 
course of the church's history and to the dynamic experience of the concrete 
Christian community" (ibid., 98). Rice seems to be correct in claiming that the 
Reformers' practical usage of theological sources amounted to the prima rather than 
sola Scriptura prinaple (ibid.). 
35Donald G. Bloesch, A Theology of Word and Spirit: Authority and Method in 
Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992)) 135. 
%is is the position of classical theology, of which Thomas Aquinas is a 
widely recognized representative. Within the neoclassical tradition, Pannenberg 
recognizes that philosophy cannot prove the existence of God, "but it still retains the 
critical function of the natural theology of antiquity relative to every form of 
religious tradition, i.e, that of imposing minimal conditions for talk about God that 
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philosophy provides the tools for conceptual analysis and schemes 
that lead to a deeper understanding of Christian or that 
human philosophy supplements theology by helping to produce a 
rational reformulation of biblical truths in order to address the 
current situation." Yet, even the suggestion that an a priori and 
grounding faith encounter of grace "purifies" our natural reason 
from sin and allows us to use it for theological purposes39 is not 
wants to be taken seriously as such" (Systematic Theology, 1:107). Within the classical 
and neo-classical system of theology, biblical language is considered to be symbolic 
and metaphoric, but may, nonetheless, contain some conceptual contents. Due to the 
hidden conceptual element in the metaphorical language of the Bible, this language 
must be subjected to a "conceptual analysis" which may allow theologians to identify 
the concepts hidden in the metaphorical language. It is easy to see that within this 
kind of theological project philosophy is called to determine what concept and 
metaphor mean. Philosophy also determines what concept and conceptual analysis 
of metaphoric language are. The minimal results of applying reason to the contents 
of faith entail a major reinterpretation of the literal meanings of the Bible. Norman 
L. Geisler, who agrees with the basic philosophical view of classical theologian 
Thomas Aquinas (Thomas Aquinas: An Ewngelical Appraisal), and David Tracy, who, 
agreeing with the classical function of philosophy, replaces the Aristotelian 
metaphysics of Aquinas with his own understanding of process philosophy (Blessed 
Rage for Order, 146-203), can be considered as belonging, respectively, to the classical 
and neo-classical theological traditions. 
37See, e.g., Vincent Brummer, Theology and Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction 
[Philadelphia: Westrninster, 19821, ix). Kevin J. Vanhoozer, correctly recognizing that 
both philosophy and theology "are in the business of constructing worldviews," goes 
so far as to state that "ultimately, we are led to view philosophy and theology 
themselves as competing research programs working on the problem of life's 
meaning" ("Christ and Concept Doing Theology and the 'Ministry' of Philosophy," 
in Doing Thedogy in Today's World, ed. J. D. Woodbridge and T. E. McComiskey 
[Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 19911, 135). But competing does not mean 
conflicting. According to Vanhoozer, "the philosopher plays the role of Aaron next 
to theology's Moses, providing the language with which to communicate the Word 
of God to a wondering people" (ibid.). At the end, however, philosophy is given at 
least the traditional minimal role of "conceptual analysis" and "the pedagogical 
function of leading unbelievers and believers alike to a deeper understanding of 
Christ and the implications of a Christian worldview" (140). 
"Osborne, 2%-297. Through the mediation of theological tradition, "deductive 
reasoning utilizes logic to establish theological models that can be verified on the 
basis of evidence" (ibid., 298). According to Osborne, in doing theology the philo- 
sophical deductive models interact with the inductive data produced by biblical 
exegesis. This constitutes what Osborne calls a "spiral" through which concepts are 
refined and brought under the norm of Scripture. 
184 FERNANDO L CANALE 
enough to prevent philosophical ideas from distorting biblical 
revelation. 
While it should be recognized that neither systematic nor 
biblical theologies are independent from philosophical issues, they 
may be developed in independence from human philosophical 
interpretations. Therefore, a momentous methodological distinction 
needs to be decisively drawn between philosophical issues and 
their interpretation. The human discipline we designate as 
philosophy involves both issues and interpretations. Issues are the 
problems to be addressed, for instance, God, man, reality as a 
whole, reason. Interpretations are the way in which these issues 
have been understood by various philosophical schools throughout 
the history of philosophy.* Human philosophy provides solutions 
to the issues on the basis of natural information and the use of 
human reason and imagination?' 
Both biblical and systematic theologies need to interpretU the 
same issues as philosophy interprets (God, human nature, reality, 
reason, etc.)? Thus, the issues cannot be dismissed. However, 
"'Thus I agree with Paul Tillich when he states that "philosophy and theology 
ask the question of being" (Systematic Thaology [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
19511,l: 22), thus implying that both share the same subject matter. I disagree with 
T ich ,  however, when he goes on to say that "philosophy deals with the structure 
of being in itself; theology deals with the meaning of being for us" (ibid.), thus 
implying that philosophy and theology do not share the same subject matter after 
all, but rather have very different, though mutually complementary, objects of study. 
''David Tracy has suggested the replacement of the Thomistic understanding 
of reason as agent intellect by a less ambitious "analogical imagination" as the 
appropriate tool for the constitution of systematic theology (The Analogical 
Imagination: Christian ThaoIogy and the Culture of Pluralism New York, NY: Crossroad, 
19811,421,429-438). This replacement of reason by imagination reveals the extent 
of Kant's influence on modem and post-modern theological epistemology. The role 
of imagination in theology and its relation to the Schleirmacherian feeling of 
absolute dependence stems from Kant's third critique (see The Critique af judgement, 
trans. James Geed Meredith [Oxford: Qarendon, 19281, 1: 1-3; 2: 49). 
'%acy summarizes the contemporary view of knowledge by remarking that 
"to understand at all is to interpret" (Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, 
Hope [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987, 9). The idea that biblical revelation 
involves both historical fact and interpretation has been recognized by Oscar 
Cullmann (Saloation in History [London: SCM Press, 1967, 88-97). Hans Kiing, 
basically agreeing on this point with Cullmann, goes even further and affirms that 
"every experience already brings elements of interpretation with it" (Theology for the 
Third Millennium, 109). 
'%, e.g., Kroner, 13. 
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theology does not need to follow any humanly conceived inter- 
pretation. On the contrary, if biblical thinking is taken seriously, 
theology should develop an understanding of these issues on the 
basis of-and in full harmony with-the interpretation they receive 
in S a i ~ t u r e . ~  In order to avoid theological distortion, humanly 
originated ideas should be dismissed in the definition of the system 
adopted by Christian theology. 
The historical way in which the Bible interprets the issues of 
God and human nature, which play a foundational presupposi- 
tional role in the formulation of any theological discourse, has been 
fatefully forgotten for nearly two millenia. The philosophical 
formulations on which Christian theology has been cast since then 
often depart from the biblical interpretation of the issues. When 
these formulations are discarded, a new and exciting system, not 
only for approaching the origin of Scripture but also for the 
constitution of the whole theological enterprise comes into view? 
%e importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. I am not referring 
to the kind of study which, for instance, Claude Tresmontant has developed 
regarding biblical metaphysics. Tresmontant is right about some general issues, such 
as that the "absence de certains termes mbtaphysiques n'implique pas une carence 
m6taphysiqueU ( h i e s  de dtaphysique biblique [Paris: J. Gabalda, 1955],32-33); that 
irreconcilable opposition exists between biblical and Greek metaphysics (ibid., 34- 
35); and that the created world is temporal in nahue (ibid., 122). However, he does 
not follow biblical thinking in the interpretation of reality. On the contrary, 
Tresmontant follows a methodology which, starting from the identification of some 
biblical concepts, uses them in a second step as justification for adopting a 
previously existent metaphysical position presented as the metaphysics of Scriphue. 
The identification of the temporal nahue of the phenomenal world of creation 
allows him to identify Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary cosmology as the inner 
metaphysical structure of created beings (ibid., 95, 164). While I agree with 
Tresmontant on his general idea that the Bible speaks to philosophical issues in a 
way that radically departs from traditional philosophical interpretations, I go 
beyond him in suggesting that the grounding philosophical problems have received 
specific solutions in the Bible. Thus, for instance, Tresmontant does not go to the 
Bible for the interpretation of issues such as 'Being', man, knowledge, and, history. 
Such an interpretation, as argued in my first article, provides the ground for the 
interpretation of the doctrine of revelation and inspiration as well as the 
understanding of the entire range of Christian doctrines. Unfortunately, even 
evangelicals like Carl Henry, who claims that "divine revelation rationally interprets 
an objective revelational history" (3255, 260), believe in cognitive propositional 
revelation (3:248,259), hold a verbal plenary doctrine of inspiration (4:160), and do 
not explore the philosophical conceptuality of Scriptures in order to interpret the 
philosophical issues and systematic presuppositions necessary for doing theology. 
'%is point is not yet clearly perceived by many within the Protestant 
evangelical tradition who still think that Calvin's picking and choosing philosophical 
ideas in service of biblical theology (see fn. 22) is the proper solution to the 
philosoph y-theology relationship (see Bloesch, 264-265). 
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Scientific faithfulness to the sula Scriptura principle should 
replace any humanly originated interpretation of philosophical 
issues by one of biblical origin. Thus, it should be possible to 
envision a systematic theology which, while fully integrating the 
necessary philosophical issues required for its disciplinary develop- 
ment, may, at the same time, work independently from any human 
philosophical principles and in total faithfulness to biblical ones. 
5.  The Systematic Method: 
Identifying the Subject Matter 
The systematic methodology I am suggesting here involves 
three major components: data, subject matter, and system. When 
applied, this methodology processes the data from the perspective 
provided by the system, in search of a better understanding of the 
proposed subject matter. From a scientific viewpoint, the data best 
qualified to shed light on the exploration of the origin of Scripture 
come from Scripture itself. And, since such a fact agrees with the 
sola Scriptura principle that provided the ground for a new 
approach to the doctrine of revelation and inspiration, it now 
seems necessary to clarify the subject matter to be investigated and 
the main components of the system as they relate to the subject 
matter itself. 
The systematic approach differs from the exegetical one in that 
the latter is text-oriented while the former is issue-oriented. In 
other words, the subject matter that the biblical approach tries to 
clarify is the text of the Bible and its message, while the systematic 
approach tries to clarify an issue that belongs to reality itself. 
Consequently, when the study of the doctrine of revelation 
and inspiration is approached exegetically and biblically, the 
biblical teachings that have been produced in relation to the 
doctrine of Scripture come into view. The result of such an 
enterprise is an organized exposition of the biblical doctrine of 
Scripture.& On the other hand, when the doctrine of revelation and 
46For an introduction to the biblical doctrine on Scripture, see Alan M. Stibbs, 
'The Witness of Scripture to Its Inspiration," in Reuelatiun and the Bible: Contemporary 
Emngelical Thought, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1958), 107-118; 
Pierre Ch. Marcel, " Our Lord's Use of Scripture," in Rawlation and the Bible, 121-134; 
Wayne A. Grudem, 'Scripture's Self-Attestation and the koblem of Formulating a 
Doctrine of Scripture," in Scripture and Truth, ed. D. A. Carson and J. D. Woodbridge 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1983), 19-59; John W. Wenham, "Christ's View of 
Scripture," in Inerrancy, 3-36; and Edwin A. Blum, 'The Apostles' View of Scripture," 
in Inerrancy, 39-53. 
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inspiration is approached systematically, the problem regarding the 
epistemological origin of Scripture comes under scrutiny. It seems, 
then, that in order for a systematic methodology to be applied to 
the doctine of revelation and inspiration, it is necessary to have a 
clear picture of the problem, issue, and subject matter to be 
clarified. 
The subject matter in question appears to include the two 
interrelated, mutually complementary components we call 
revelation and inspiration. When the word "revelation" is utilized 
as a technical term/' it refers to the cognitive processM through 
which the Bible and its manifold contents were originated. When 
"inspiration" is utilized as a technical term, it refers to the linguistit 
process through which the content originated through the 
revelation process as expressed in oral or written  form^.'^ In short, 
the subject matter of the revelation-inspiration doctrine appears as 
the twofold, complementary process by which, first, the contents, 
ideas:' information, and data of Scripture were originated; and 
  he technical usage of the terms "revelation" and "inspiration" does not derive 
from biblical exegesis. Their meanings are, however, not unrelated to biblical 
concepts. Thus, revelation is connected with the idea of contents that are 
communicated from God to men, while the biblical idea of inspiration is related to 
the production of Scripture. 
%omas Aquinas considers revelation (prophecy) to be cognitive (ST Ia. IIa. 
171. 1). However, he did not make a technical distinction between revelation and 
inspiration. Cf. Claude Tresmontant, Le problPme de la rh&twn (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1969), 79-98. I use the word "cognitive" in its broadest sense. Liberal 
Schleiermacherian approaches to revelation, even when recognizing the existence of 
an original "event" or divine-human "contact" at the root of revelation, do not 
consider such an "event" in itself to be cognitive. Yet, because it is precisely the 
revelatory "event" that prompts the writing of Scriptures, it can be loosely described 
as "cognitive." According to the liberal view, then, revelation, in spite of its non- 
cognitive nature, may be included in our general definition of revelation as cognitive 
because of its prompting the writing of the Bible. 
'She definition of inspiration as the process of "inscripturization" is systematic 
rather than exegetical. A study of the biblical words theopneustos and pheromenoi (2 
Tim 3:16 and 2 Pet 1:21) reveals that these words, which following their Lath 
translation have been traditionally rendered as "inspiration," do not convey the 
technical meaning that we are suggesting. They rather include both: what we 
technically define as "revelation" and what we technically define as "inspiration." 
50 In this article I am not using the word "idea" in its Platonic sense, to refer 
only to the "general, universal, and necessary features" of reality and language. I use 
the term to indicate the cognitive status of the information. "Idea" refers to and 
includes any and all possible contents that, once produced in the mind of the writer, 
may later on be inscripturized in the Bible. 
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second, the process through which they are transmitted either 
orally or in a written form? In other words, revelation appears as 
the issue or problem to be concretely interpreted by any theory of 
revelation. Thus, it is possible to say that the formal subject matter 
of revelation appears as the divinehuman encounter which may be 
epistemolo 'cally interpreted by any possible doctrine of 
revela tion. l? 
The creation of the Bible as a written work required a process 
complementary to revelation, one by which ideas and information 
originated through revelation were put into writing. The process of 
putting revealed ideas and information into writing is by nature a 
linguistic enterprise and is designated as the process of inspiration. 
As is the case in the process of revelation, the process of inspiration 
Blso involves both divine and human dimensions. It seems clear 
that, except in very specific cases, Scripture was actually written by 
a human agent. Since I am still describing the formal subject matter 
that is to be interpreted by any possible theoretical account of the 
origin of Scripture, no doctrine of inspiration is assumed. To say 
that inspiration is the process by which revealed ideas and 
information are put into writing means that the process by which 
the writing occurs is different from the process by which the 
meaning and content of Scripture first came into existence in the 
mind of the prophet or holy writer. 
SITaking their lead from the biblical claim of God's being the author of 
Scripture, the fathers understood such an authorship in rather literalistic terms 
under the broad category of inspiration (Vawter, Biblical Inspiration, 2528). 
Obviously, this broad conception of inspiration included also the idea of origination 
of contents, and therefore, of revelation per se. Evangelical theologian Carl Henry 
distinguishes between revelation (3:248) and inspiration (4129) in the technical sense 
suggested here (see also Donald Nash, The Wold of God and the Mind of M u n  [Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 19821, 50). On the other hand, Norman L. Geisler and 
William E. Nix conceptualize the origin of Scriptures by way of a general 
understanding of inspiration which indudes revelation (A General Introduction to the 
Bible [Chicago: Moody Pressf 19861,3842). When the technical distinction between 
revelation and inspiration is not utilized as a tool for analysis, the tendency seems 
to be to conceive the origination of the Bible with God as principal agent and the 
human author as instrument. 
"vine-human encounters may include a variety of forms. For instance, 
salvation is to be understood in the context of a divine-human encounter or 
relationship. In other words, God encounters men and women with different 
purposes; one of them is to originate Scriptures. In this article I refer to encounter 
only in the latter sense. 
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The act of revelation, as a cognitive process in which both God 
and human agencies are involved, appears as an a priori condition 
to the act of inspiration (in which also divine and human agencies 
are involved). In other words, without the cognitive revelation 
process, the linguistic process of inspiration is empty: it has 
nothing to transmit in either written or oral form. Without inspira- 
tion, on the other hand, the cognitive process of revelation would 
be fruitless; producing nothing to be communicated in writing or 
spoken words, it would, therefore, wither away, along with the 
prophet. Revelation and inspiration, then, are complementary 
processes always necessarily involved in the theological explana- 
tion of the origin of Scripture.S3 Furthermore, any interpretation of 
the revelation-inspiration process finds its ground in the 
understanding of revelation, rather than of inspiration. This formal 
"subordination" of the process of inspiration to the process of 
revelation is due to the inner articulation of the subject matter 
itself: revelation originates the contents that inspiration puts into 
writing. The production of the Bible, then, assumes and requires 
both processes. In this sense, it is possible to say that the whole 
Bible is revealed and the whole Bible is inspired. 
Usually a technical distinction between revelation and 
inspiration has not been considered as a necessary methodological 
step to be followed in the investigation of the origin of Scripture? 
U Consequently, there is no such a thing as portions of Scripture that are only 
inspired and not revealed. The origin of all ideas and information as they relate to 
God must be'accounted for before the process of writing (inspiration) is addressed. 
Thus, the distinction made by Roman Catholic Leonard Lessius (1554-1U2) between 
"textos profbtims o de revelacidn y textos no-profhtims o de simple inspiracidn 
hagiogr6ficaW is insufficient because it reduces the idea of revelation to a prophetic 
model. It is clear, however, that God has revealed Himself in various ways 
(Heb 1:1), which certainly include more than the prophetic model (Antonio M. 
Artola, De la rmlacidn a la inspiracidn. [Bilbao: Ediciones Mensajero, 19831,119). 
W p t u r e  does not draw a technical distinction between revelation and 
inspiration, as I am suggesting. Scripture tends to speak generally rather than 
analytically regarding its own origin. Thus, in 2 Tim 3:16 and 2 Pet 1:21 there is no 
explicit technical distinction between revelation and inspiration as subject matter of 
an epistemological search. Nonetheless, the cognitive process by which knowledge 
and information were originated in the mind of the prophet and the linguistic 
process by which the revealed knowledge and information were put into written 
form are assumed. Since each process is different, and includes different kinds of 
activities in which both God and man are involved, it is of paramount importance 
to approach the analysis of each separately. Unfortunately, theologians have often 
dealt with the issue of the origin of Scripture without dearly defining the terms or 
the systematic issues involved (see I. Howard Marshall, Biblifal Inspiration [Grand 
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Consideration of both processes under the general designation of 
inspiration has produced interpretations which, building on the 
general concepts of divine authorship and human instrumentality, 
are unable to account properly for the variety of biblical phenom- 
ena uncovered by exegetical studies. It follows that complexity and 
variety in the effect suggest complexity and variety in the cause. 
Establishing a distinction between the process of revelation and 
inspiration, therefore, may prove useful in the task of probing the 
way in which Scripture was produced. 
A third related stage may be added to the revelation and 
inspiration processes, namely, illumination. As a technical term, 
illumination refers to the process through which God communi- 
. cates to the individual believer on the basis of already-existent oral 
or written revelationO5' Since illumination is a process that assumes 
the existence of oral or written revelation and, consequently, does 
not contribute to its production, it will not be considered in this 
article. 
6. The Systematic Mefhod: Identifying 
the PresuppitionaI Structure 
In order for the methodology to formulate a new inter- 
pretation of the revelation-inspiration doctrine to be complete, the 
philosophical issues involved in the "system" need to be identified. 
As the philosophical issues necessarily involved in the understand- 
ing of the doctrine of revelation and inspiration are identified, the 
systematic structure on which any interpretation of the doctrine 
stands will become apparent. The task before us, then, consists in 
identifying the philosophical issues to be systematically pre- 
supposed in any possible interpretation of the origin of Scripture. 
Consideration, therefore, needs to be given not only to the 
issue of the subject matter to be clarified, but also to the inner 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 19821, 3147; and Trembath, 3-7). Artola points out that 
within the Roman Catholic tradition, prior to Vatican I the terms revelation and 
inspiration were not satisfactorily defined (120). The same lack of precision seems 
to appear in Preus's evaluation of Lutheran dogmaticians in the 17th century (29-30). 
The systematic distinction I am suggesting is drawn, within a Thornistic tradition, 
by Paul Synave and Pierre Benoit (Prophecy and Inspiration: A Commentary on the 
Summ Thaologica 11-11, Questions 171-178, trans. Avery R. Dulles and Thomas L. 
Sheridan N e w  York: Descl&, 1%1], 110). 
''For a recent interpretation of inspiration as illumination, see Trembath, 5-6, 
and 72-118. 
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systematic structure that the revelation-inspiration phenomenon 
itself presupposes. By "systematic structure" I am referring to the 
presuppositions that are necessarily involved in understanding the 
way in which the Bible was epistemologically originated. 
The systematic structure assumed by the revelation process is 
rather simple, as suggested in the preceding section. If revelation 
is the process by which God communicates himself to the holy 
writer, the systematic structure that revelation involves appears to 
include the interpretation of God and human nature. Thus, whether 
the revelation process is to be understood as existential, cognitive, 
mystical, or otherwise is an issue that depends on the way in 
which the system presupposed by the revelation process is 
concretely interpreted. Any doctrine about the way Scripture was 
originated includes a specific, concrete interpretation of the system, 
namely, an interpretation of the two agents involved in the 
revelation process: Gods6 and man. Since the inspiration process 
also involves the same two agents who are involved in the 
revelation process, it follows that any possible interpretation of the 
inspiration process involves the same systematic presuppositions 
that are required by the revelation process, namely, a specific 
interpretation of God and human nature? 
Furthermore, the systematic structure assumed by the 
revelation-inspiration process includes a complex ensemble of 
related concepts, which necessarily play a constitutive role in the 
understanding of the revelation-inspiration process. Some of these 
concepts are, for instance, the interpretation of human cognition 
and language as well as the understanding of divine activity. 
Briefly put, the presupposi tional structure that is uncovered by 
the phenomenological analysis of the formal subject-matter of the 
doctrine of revelation and inspiration includes: first, an interpre- 
tation of God and his acts; and second, an interpretation of human 
? h e  presuppositional systematic function of the theological-philosophical 
interpretation of God is widely accepted in theological circles. For instance, we find 
Gordon D. Kaufman underlining the methodological fundion of the doctrine of God 
in Christian theology; he remarks that "the word 'God' appears to designate the last 
or ultimate point of reference to which all action, consciousness and reflection can 
lead" (An Essay on Theological Method  iss sou la, MT: Scholars, 19751, 11). 
57The involvement of "two minds in the process of inspiration, a divine Auctur, 
and a human Scriptor" in the inspiration of Scripture has been pointed out by John 
Henry Newman ("Inspiration in its Relation to Revelation," in On the Inspiration of 
Scripture, ed. J. Derek Holmes and Robert Murray [Washington, DC: Corpus, 19671, 
115). 
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nature along with its cognitive and linguistic functions? Once 
these ideas are given actual content by way of interpretation, they 
become the "system" that is required by the systematic methodol- 
ogy to process the biblical data in search for a clarification of the 
subject matter itself, that is, of the revelation-inspiration process 
that originated Scripture. 
Different theological schools, sharing different interpretations 
of the systematic structure employed by the systematic method, are 
bound to render diverse theories about the revelation-inspiration 
process, some of which are mutually incompatible. Hence the vast 
differences that may be found in the various doctrines of revelation 
and inspiration that have been developed so far by Christian 
theology. 
The systematic method, then, proceeds by clarifying its subject 
matter from the point of view of a "system" of ideas that play the 
role of organizing presuppositions. In classical, modem, and 
postmodern schools of Christian theology the "system" of ideas that 
serve as organizing presuppositions is taken from various 
traditions of human philosophy. 
Finally, it is important to notice that the uncovering of the 
systematic structure assumed by the revelation-inspiration process 
shows that the interpretation of the doctrine of revelation and 
inspiration is not the ultimate ground for theological discourse. The 
ultimate ground for theological discourse is provided by the 
biblical interpretation of the systematic structure itself, as was 
suggested in the first article. 
7.  Toward a New Model for the Doctrine of 
Revelation and Inspiration 
In the first article of this series the ground on which a new 
approach to the revelation-inspiration doctrine should be explored 
and formulated was uncovered. The ground consisted of the 
biblical interpretation of both God and human nature, which in this 
second article were identified as the very components of the formal 
systematic structure. This structure, presupposed in the systematic 
methodology, must be utilized in the investigation of the subject 
matter: the epistemological origin of Scripture. 
w e  systematic function of God and man in theology is universal. As 
components of the systematic structure of theology, their interpretation becomes a 
condition for the understanding of most theological ideas and doctrines. The 
systematic extent of the idea of God as a presupposition of theological thinking is, 
however, broader than the systematic extent of the idea of man. 
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As argued in the first article, the biblical interpretation of the 
systematic structure radically differs from the philosophical inter- 
pretation assumed by classical and liberal theologies. Therefore, a 
systematic methodology which could-beyond the limitations of 
biblical theology and apologetics-be useful in exploring the origin 
of Scripture, in search of a new model of revelation-inspiration, 
seems to be possible. 
On the basis of the discussion of the ground (first article) and 
methodology (present article) required in the interpretation of the 
epistemological origin of Scripture, the possibility for and way in 
which a new interpretation could be formulated has come into 
view. In the process some important specific points are evident. 
First of all, it has been shown that any interpretation of the 
revelation-inspiration process by which Scripture was originated 
necessarily presupposes a previous understanding about God and 
man. Since these presuppositions cannot be avoided, they appear 
as components of a systematic structure within which interpreta- 
tions of the epistemological origin of Scripture are generated. 
Second, the main components of the systematic structure required 
in the conception of theories regarding revela tion-inspira tion have 
been understood in various ways by Christian theological tradi- 
tions, thus producing a variety of explanatory models. Third, in 
spite of their divergences, the already-existent doctrinal models of 
revelation and inspiration (thought, verbal-dictation, and 
encounter-existential theories) work on the methodological 
assumption that the components of the systematic structure should 
be interpreted by humanly originated philosophy, and that on such 
a basis the being and activities of God and man should be 
conceived as timeless. Fourth, the critical clarification of the various 
possible models in which the origin of Scripture have been and 
could be interpreted requires the methodological disassociation of 
the epistemological and apologetical levels of theological analysis. 
The traditional lack of proper distinction between these two levels 
has led to an overemphasis of the apologetical approach. The origin 
of Scripture should be approached first from an epistemological 
perspective; and only then, when a proper understanding of it has 
been achieved, should theology move into the apologetical realm. 
Fifth, the sola Scriptura principle, on which a sector of Protestant 
theology is built, requires that the interpretation of the systematic 
structure in question be produced from within biblical concep 
tuality without resorting to extrabiblical philosophies. Sixth, when 
the sda Scriptura principle is consistently applied to the 
interpretation of the systematic structure of revelation and 
inspiration, the biblical conception about God and human nature 
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as temporal-historical realities capable of direct interrelation 
replaces the classical and liberal traditions, which do not have 
room for such a dynamic understanding of God's being and 
actions. 
8. Conclusion 
From the perspective gained through the preceding analysis, 
the methodology for a new approach to revelation and inspiration, 
to be developed in faithfulness to biblical conceptuality, has been 
uncovered. Moreover, the presuppositional systematic structure 
that conditions the formulation of any revelation-inspiration model 
has been exposed. The possibility that such a systematic structure 
could be interpreted othertvise than Christian theology has chosen 
to do so far has also become apparent. 
The possible new interpretation of the revelation-inspiration 
doctrine, made feasible by the ground and methodology pointed 
out so far, is not to be generated by the creative imagination of 
daring theologians, but rather by the patient and scientific hearing 
of the available data, namely, by hearing what Scripture says about 
itself and considering what Scripture shows us to be. In a time 
when Christian theology is searching for new paradigms that may 
better help to understand and express the Christian identity to the 
world, a critical examination of the ideas that have preconditioned 
Christian theology for centuries and a search for yet-undiscovered 
treasures of biblical truth seem to provide a way full of theological 
promise, not only for the specific doctrine of revela tion-inspira tion, 
but for the entire system of Christian theology as well. 
A practical question remains. Is it really necessary for 
Christian theology to involve itself in the area of presuppositions 
and system so far studied by philosophy in order to produce 
another interpretation of revelation and inspiration? Moreover, 
does the way one interprets the origin of Scripture make a real 
difference in one's theology? Is it not acceptable to adopt any 
theory as long as one is able to maintain the full authority of the 
Bible? The possibility that Christian theology could approach the 
study of revelation and inspiration in search of a model yet to be 
theologically and technically formulated seems to follow from our 
analysis of both the ground and the methodology involved in 
thinking and clarifymg the many issues in the epistemological 
inquiry about the origin of Scripture. The question of the practical 
necessity for undertaking such a task will be considered in the 
third and final article of this series. 
